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When nation building is at odds with economic reform 
and EU membership
Lars Johannsen and Karin Hilmer Pedersen
Abstract: While small state logic and the imperative of a return to Europe by 
and large explain why the stringent EU requirements were adopted by the can-
didate countries prior to membership it, is not sufﬁ cient to explain why they did 
so to varying degree and at different speeds. Through a comparative analysis of 
four countries, it is argued that different choices in nation-building affected the 
countries’ capacity to handle large-scale reforms resulting, in a ‘go-go’ process 
in the Czech Republic and Estonia and a ‘stop-go’ process in Slovakia and Latvia. 
Consequently, at present, as membership of the European Union is well underway, 
Slovakia and Latvia have already had their nation building discussions. The pend-
ing question is what the political consequences will be in the Czech Republic and 
Estonia if and when nation building ﬁ nds its way back to the political arena.
Keywords: Economic reform, EU, Nation building, Comparative method, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia
January 1, 2004 saw the climax of more than ten years of negotiation between the 
Baltic and Central and East European states and the European Union. The process 
was neither smooth nor painless. Since 1998 it was closely monitored by the EU 
Commission, which required adherence to a set of political, economic, legislative 
and administrative conditions. The question is not why the countries accepted the 
stringent EU requirements, but why they did so to varying degrees and at different 
speeds. 
Compared to global and regional powers, small states like those examined here, 
have substantially different options available when responding to the economic and 
cultural pressures of globalization. While the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded 
political freedom, it also exposed the economies of these countries to ﬁ erce com-
petition from the world economy. Moreover, the opening of their economies was 
accompanied by price liberalization and transition from state to private ownership, 
causing an immediate deterioration of living standards and massive unemployment. 
Faced with these difﬁ culties, membership of the European Union came to be the 
‘natural’ destiny.
The European Union was, however, at ﬁ rst not very keen on welcoming the former 
communist countries. Although trade agreements were made in the early 1990ies 
and the rhetoric stressed Europe’s moral obligation to ‘heal the wound from 1945’, 
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the EU member states were reluctant to admit politically instable and economi-
cally poor countries to the community. At the same time, the post-communist coun-
tries claimed that the European trade agreements were more in favour of the EU 
members than their poorer neighbours. Thus, the negotiation process constituted 
a highly asymmetrical ‘take it or leave it’ relation, in which the current EU member 
states set the conditions and the ‘outsiders’ simply had to comply if they wanted to 
become full members of the EU (see, for example, Moravscik - Vachaudova 2003).
Why did the countries accept the conditions set by the European Union? First, 
a ‘small state’ logic posits that membership of a free trade zone reduces economic un-
certainty by expanding the domestic market (Armstrong - Read 1998: 574). Second, 
participation in a free trade zone as a full member compared to a more loose con-
struction consisting of trade arrangements changes the power relation, giving the 
smaller states a comparatively stronger voice in setting trade conditions and regula-
tions (Vachaudova 2005). Following this, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) 
argue that EU membership was considered such powerful magic that domestic 
costs of the EU requirements were inconsiderable compared to the beneﬁ ts to be 
gained by becoming full members. Finally, historical and cultural ties to Europe 
legitimized the choice of alliance and are often referred to as the main factor for 
compliance with EU requirements.
The small state logic, the similar exposition to world economic competition and 
the attractiveness of EU membership are arguments  that the EU requirements were 
accepted. However, neither explanation can tell us why some states had greater 
difﬁ culties in adopting the EU requirements than others. The Baltic and Central 
and East European states were challenged not only by political and economic 
transition. They also faced the necessity of rebuilding the state and reconstructing 
a nation. However, analyses of post-communist transitions have until recently tend-
ed to ignore the impact of nation building as well as the international context (Kuzio 
2001). Although they increase the level of complexity, the inclusion of these aspects 
nevertheless enhances our understanding of the process.
The claim raised here is that the way national elites handled the burning issue of 
nation building provides additional insight into the process of political and eco-
nomic change, and thus, the countries\ road to economic recovery and EU member-
ship. This claim will be tested in a comparative study of four countries, Estonia, 
Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Our research design is discussed in the 
next section. Section two looks into the concrete identiﬁ cation of the variables, and 
thus the application of the research design to our four cases. In section three we 
look into the dependent variable: economic reform success. As all four countries 
can be described as successful in in having been accepted as EU member states, 
we attack the question of economic reform success from different angles and build 
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up an argument that the four countries in fact took different paths to European 
integration. Section four analyses how the nation building process in each country 
is related to these paths. In the concluding section we discuss the possible political 
consequences of disregarding nation building in the pursuit of economic reform 
and Europeanization.
The research design 
Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are selected in what we call 
a 2+2 comparative research design based on the principles of a most similar systems 
design (MSSD). Within this design, a series of homogenous independent variables 
are identiﬁ ed and thus eliminated as possible causes of any given development. This 
design means that it is possible to neutralize the effect of one set of variables, while 
simultaneously underlining the importance of others (Landman 2000; Mahoney 
2004; Lijphart 1971/1975). For example, the crucial role played by parliamen-
tarism has been used to explain the success of democratic and economic transition 
in post-communist countries (Nørgaard 2000). By selecting these particular cases, 
which all adopted parliamentary democracy as their political system, we eliminate 
the effect of parliamentarism on their road to EU membership and investigate the 
importance of another factor, namely nation building. Thus, within the 2+2 design 
we search for explanations by studying parallel variations between the explanatory 
variable and the dependent variable. 
Although the MSSD is widely used in political science, applying it is certainly 
not unproblematic. The ﬁ rst problem is related to the identiﬁ cation of the explana-
tory variable that may affect the outcome, thus eliminating every other possible 
independent variable. The most common advice here is to build your choice of ex-
planatory variable on theoretical observations (Peters 1998). In our research design 
we claim that differences in how the political elites handled the minority question 
is a reasonable candidate in explaining why there were differences in especially 
the economic transformation. In our case, the theoretical basis builds on Roger 
Brubaker’s (1996) analysis of the re-emergence of nationalism in Central and East-
ern Europe. He argues that because post-communist states were re-established in 
accordance with the Westphalian view of the state, the founding principal was the 
existence of one nation. As the post-communist states constitute a patch-work of 
nationalities and minorities, anti-discriminatory policies may give rise to dissatis-
faction in the ‘titular’ population because they feel that the state is not sufﬁ ciently 
attentive towards them. Such dissatisfaction provides fertile ground for populism 
based on nationalism, thus removing political attention from economic hardship. 
The second problem is related to variable and case selection and thereby whether 
make generalizations are possible when claiming that the background variables are 
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indeed similar. The challenge is to eliminate as many differences as possible by 
accepting the difference between similar and same. That is to say, even though the 
countries are similar on a number of parameters, they are not necessarily identical 
or the same. The discussion of transitology, area studies and comparative method 
between Bruce, Schmitter and Karl highlighted exactly this problem when they 
debated the extent to which transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe were 
comparable to post-communist transitions (Bunce 1995a/1995b; Schmitter 1994; 
Karl – Schmitter 1995). But even when looking at post-communist transitions, there 
are considerable differences in how and to what extent they were integrated in the 
Soviet political and economic system. Hence, even though the countries are similar 
in terms of a communist political and economic heritage, they are not therefore the 
same in relation to how that heritage will continue to affect their political choices 
and economic opportunities.
Acceptance of the limitations inherent in MSSD makes the careful selection of 
countries imperative, although comparability difﬁ culties cannot be eliminated en-
tirely. The four countries we gave selected have all been exposed to state ownership 
and planned economy. However, there are important differences in how closely 
they were integrated in the Soviet economic system; Estonia and Latvia were fully 
integrated as Soviet Republics, whereas the Check Republic and Slovakia had in-
dependent economies but were integrated through their membership of the Soviet 
trade organization, COMECON. This difference is the main reason why we talk 
about a 2+2 design. But even though we try to eliminate differences in economic 
(and political) heritage the countries within each group are still not the same – only 
more similar. Thus, if we move one step further in the discussion, Estonia and 
Latvia may have experienced the same level of integration into the Soviet economy, 
but Latvia was burdened with a large concentration of heavy industry, the Soviet 
dinosaurs that proved to be very difﬁ cult to reorganize and make competitive in 
a market economy (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 144). In a similar way, the Czech 
Republic had an economic advantage over her Slovakian counterpart as most in-
dustry was placed in this region, while the Slovakian economy was primarily based 
on agriculture. These economic parameters most likely affected the potential for 
success in the reform period and when analyzing the cases, we will keep these 
differences in mind.
The limitations of MSSD are also its strength because a reduction in the number 
of cases enables a more in-depth examination of causal processes over time and 
a thorough study of combinations (Mahoney 2004). Thus, narrowing the focus to 
only four countries allows us to examine the reform processes over time. In addi-
tion, the choice of a 2+2 design means we can examine our explanatory variable in 
varying combinations of national political, economic, and international conditions.
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Identifying the variables 
The four countries were chosen because they exhibit a variety of comparable 
background variables (see table 1). First, economically and population wise they 
are all small, and hence the small state logic of seeking to become a member of 
larger economic entities should objectively be advantageous. Second, as com-
mented upon earlier, all four introduced democratic parliamentarianism. Third and 
ﬁ nally, all four countries faced the challenge of making the transition to democracy 
and market economy while in the process of reestablishing themselves as sovereign 
states, making it a triple transition (Offe – Adler 1991). On the one side we have 
Estonia and Latvia who, in their struggle for independence, contributed heavily to 
the ﬁ nal collapse of the Soviet Union, and on the other we have the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, who decided to disband the Czechoslovakian federation shortly after 
the Velvet Revolution. The four countries we have chosen share a similar point of 
departure in relation to their Soviet political and economic heritage, that is, they 
were all communist and had planned economies. But in view of our earlier remarks 
about similar and same we have picked four countries that are pair wise the same. 
Unlike Estonia and Latvia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) 
were not integrated into the Soviet Union itself.
The last parameter that informed our choice of countries is the presence of na-
tional minorities. The importance of minorities in the countries examined here is 
greatest in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. A large inﬂ ux of Russians in the Soviet 
era has led to massive problems with citizenship and integration, causing great 
difﬁ culties for Estonia and Latvia in their state building processes. In Slovakia par-
ticularly the Hungarian minority played a role. Reinforced by fears of Hungarian 
irredentism led by conservative and national parties from Budapest, the Slovaks 
created a national identity as an us/them dichotomy. One may argue that on this 
parameter the Czech Republic differs from the three other countries as its popula-
tion is quite homogeneous. However, that did not keep the nationalists at bay in the 
Czech Republic. The EU requirement that all new members had to comply with EU 
standards for national minority rights has had the – probably unintentional – effect 
that the Moravian minority in the Czech Republic has demanded that they be ac-
corded formal status as a ’minority group’ and given regional autonomy, and the 
Romas have demanded recognition as a ’nation’ (Tesser 2003: 521). 
The tension between state building and minority policy emphasizes the causality 
in our design. For although the four cases are pair wise similar in terms of political 
and economic legacy from the Soviet Union and the fact that they had to reestablish 
themselves as sovereign states, the varying political importance accorded to na-
tion building had consequences for their ability to stay the course of economic re-
form. Our thesis is that the reasons for successful integration into the international 
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economy are to be found here and their varying political capacity to maintain an 
Europeanization strategy. This thesis is theoretically supported by two arguments.
First, a number of theoreticians have pointed out that rapid liberalization of eco-
nomic institutions, the so-called ’Big Bang’ method, will in the short term lead to loss 
of welfare, but also more quickly to economic growth than would occur if a more 
gradual and protracted approach is adopted (Przeworski 1991; Williamson 1993). 
Although the ’Big Bang’ strategy would entail a steep J curve where reforms would 
certainly hurt, the economic pain would soon be alleviated. In contrast, the gradual 
reform process was predicted to cause a less severe economic contraction, but the bot-
tom curve of the J would be extended and the economic downturn therefore severe. 
Consequently, if the reforms could be implemented fast enough, the electorate – who 
were most likely to feel the pain – would not have time to change the political agenda 
through the new democratic institutions (Balcerowicz 1994). The expectation that 
a ’Big Bang’ reform process will lead to strong economic growth has largely proved 
to be correct even though the J curve turned out to be deeper and longer than antici-
pated (Firdmuc 2003). In addition, research shows that the choice of reform model 
is highly contingent on the result of the ﬁ rst free election (Fish 1998; Bunce 1999), 
where anti-communists who gained power instituted rapid reforms. 
Second, it has been asserted that the irreversibility of the reform process and the 
certainty that changing governments will stay the economic course are essential for 
investors and the conﬁ dence of private business (Frye 2002: 315). Without credible 
commitment, which may occur if anti-reform forces gain power, uncertainty pre-
vails and it becomes too risky to invest. Furthermore, Crawford and Lijphart (1995: 
196) point out that international support for the liberalization entrepreneurs was 
very important in seeing through economic reforms. Thus, credibility is improved 
if there is consensus among the various elites who may come to govern to support 
EU membership as an independent, positive and necessary goal. 
The ﬂ ip side of the coin is that this top-down policy process tends to remove 
major areas of politics from the political debate. They thus essentially consitute 
evidence of elite constrictions on democracy (Grabel 2000). Relating this argu-
ment to our explanatory variable, nation building problems, and especially minor-
ity rights, require adaptation and readjustment processes based on inclusiveness 
because liberal democracy must be based on a political community and not on 
ethno-cultural mobilization and polarization (Kuzio 2001). We return to this aspect 
in the concluding section.
For our four countries the EU is a constant factor and conditions for entry were 
identical. The causes of differential success must therefore be found within each 
country. Even though the importance of initial choices neither can nor should be 
rejected, it does not explain why reforms are put on hold or why reform changes are 
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put on the agenda. Before we move to internal explanations we will take a closer 
look at the dependent variable, that is, how the reform process actually played out, 
and identify differences and similarities between the four countries.
Table 1: MSSD-design for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia
Control variables: Czech Republic Slovakia Estonia Latvia
Small economies Approx. 1% of 
total EU GDP
Less than 1% of 
total EU GDP
Less than 1% of 
total EU GDP
Less than 1% 
of total EU 
GDP
Population (2003) 10.3 million 5.4 million 1.4 million 2.3 million
GDP/inhabitant, 
2004, 
15.880 11.970 11.020 9.530
Form of 
government
Parliamentary 
democracy
Parliamentary 
democracy
Parliamentary 
democracy
Parliamentary 
democracy
Communist, politi-
cal and economic 
heritage
1948: Coup instigated by the national 
communist party. Integrated into the 
Eastern block economy (COMECO). 
1968: The Prague spring crushed by 
armed forces from other communist 
states
1940: Soviet annexation and 
occupation.
1945-: Resistance continues, 
forced collectivization, deporta-
tions, immigration and integration 
into Soviet planned economy
Reestablishment as 
sovereign states
1993
Czechoslovakian 
Velvet Divorce
1993
Czechoslovakian 
Velvet Divorce
1990 (in fact 
1991)
Collapse of the 
Soviet Union
1990 (in fact 
1991)
Collapse of the 
Soviet Union
National minorities 
(pct.)
Moravians: 3.7
Slovaks: 1.9
Others, including 
Roma: 4
Hungarians: 9.7
Roma: 1.7
Others: 2.8
Russians: 29.7
Others: 2.3
Russians: 37.5
Others: 4.3
Explanatory 
variable:
Choices in nation 
building
Consensus: 
among the party 
elites to exclude 
ethnicity as a 
political issue
Politicized: 
Ethnicity form a 
political cleavage 
within the party 
system
Consensus: 
among the 
p arty elites to 
exclude ethnic-
ity as a political 
issue
Politicized: 
Ethnicity form 
a political 
cleavage 
within the party 
system.
Dependent 
variables:
Adherence to 
Europeanization 
program
Yes Yes, but two 
periods:
1993-1998
1999-2004
Yes Yes, but dif-
ﬁ culties in sus-
taining political 
efﬁ ciency
Degree of eco-
nomic success
High Catching up High Lower
Sources: * Eurostat and OECD ﬁ gures quoted from Hix 2005
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Economic reform – success at varying pace
While membership of the EU can be regarded as the ultimate success criterion, 
a deeper look into the success of the countries economic reforms and their ability 
to adapt to a free and global market can be assessed by looking at a number of 
economic indicators. This section examines variation in the dependent variable by 
looking at the period between the initiation of reform and EU membership in 2004. 
The development in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita provides us with 
the general view on the economy. Figure 1 shows that after the ﬁ rst few years of 
contraction, as predicted by economists, the GDP has grown steadily. Economic 
growth got underway later in Estonia and Latvia than in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, which underlines the challenges these countries faced as former republics 
of the Soviet Union. Estonia soon pulled ahead of Latvia and had by 2004 almost 
caught up with Slovakia. Latvia has managed since the low point in 1993 to nearly 
double its GDP, but it is still the poorest of the four countries. Compared to the 
others the Czech Republic is the wealthiest.
In extension of ﬁ gure 1, the indexed development in international trade in relation 
to GDP provides insight into integration in the world economy and also serves as 
a clear illustration of the differences in economic transition. 
Figure 1: GDP per capita, PPP (2000 international, in $ 1000)
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Figure 2: International trade (percent of GDP). Index: 1992=100
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For the period 1992-2004, with the possible exception of Estonia, Figure 2 in gen-
eral showsthe difﬁ culties in adjusting to global competition and trade during the ﬁ rst 
decade. The east bloc trading system COMECON had fallen apart, and particularly 
in Latvia and Slovakia the contraction in trade is even greater than that of the overall 
economy. This is clearly shown in the case of Latvia, where trade relative to GDP drops 
by more than 40 percent during the ﬁ rst years of tradition. When we simultaneously 
consider the dramatic Latvian drop in GDP during the ﬁ rst years, it is evident that 
Latvian trade had almost come to a standstill (see ﬁ gure 1). Except for the return to the 
base line by year 2000, Slovak developments are similar to the Latvian experiences. In 
the Czech Republic changes in GDP and trade are largely parallel until around 1999. 
After 1999 the index shows a more active trade development. This indicates that the 
Czech trade in early phase was perhaps not at a complete standstill, but certainly did 
not fuel the economy. The case of Estonia shows a quite different picture. Here trade 
was of central importance from the very beginning, and total growth in trade exceeded 
that of GDP by 40 percent in 2004. In 2004 integration into the international economy 
through trade was important in three of the countries, albeit at different levels as trade 
has the most impact on the Estonian economy and the least impact on the Slovakian 
one. All in all, trade was a less important factor in the Latvian economy in 2004, 
indicating that country’s greater dependence on domestic production. 
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Developments in and the magnitude of foreign investments give an indication of 
the openness and attractiveness of an economy and can therefore be used as a mea-
sure of the extent to which a country is integrated in the world economy. According 
to the theoretical argument put forward earlier, it further gives a rough indication of 
how foreign investors evaluate the reform process. Foreign investment in the coun-
tries in relation to GDP for the period 1992–2004, cumulated foreign investments 
and investments abroad made by each country are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Incoming FDI (1992-2004) and cumulated FDI (2000)
Czech 
Republic Slovakia Estonia Latvia
FDI, Net inﬂ ow
(% of GDP)
1992 0 0 2.1 0.6
1993 1.9 1.5 4.2 1
1994 2.1 1.7 5.4 4.2
1995 4.6 1.2 4.6 3.4
1996 2.3 1.7 3.2 6.8
1997 2.3 0.8 5.4 8.5
1998 6.1 2.5 10.5 5.4
1999 10.7 1.7 5.5 4.8
2000 9 9.5 7.1 5.3
2001 9.3 7.6 9.1 1.6
2002 11.5 16.9 4 2.8
2003 2.2 2 10 2.6
2004 4.2 2.7 9.3 5.1
Cumulated FDI 
(% of GDP, year 2000)
Inward 42.6 25.6 53.2 29.5
Outward 1.5 2 5.2 3.4
Source: World Development Indicators database; UNCTAD WID Country proﬁ le: Czech Republic 
(World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org); UNCTAD WID Country proﬁ le: Slovak Re-
public (World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org); UNCTAD WID Country proﬁ le: Estonia 
(World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org); UNCTAD WID Country proﬁ le: Latvia (World 
Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org).
Over the period examined here Estonia and the Czech Republic have been con-
siderably more successful in attracting FDI than Slovakia and Latvia. However, 
Table 2 also shows that foreign investments in Slovakia increased considerably at 
the turn of the millennium. Hence, table 2 is ample illustration that Slovakia has 
had serious difﬁ culties in attracting foreign investments in the 1990s, and that the 
situation turned around after a new government took ofﬁ ce in 1998, which was 
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accompanied by a more positive evaluation by the EU in relation to membership. 
In Latvia we ﬁ nd no positive change in attractiveness to foreign investors. Table 2 
also shows the positions of the four countries in the European economy as foreign 
investment is of a much greater magnitude than outward investments by their com-
panies and citizens abroad.
In addition to the general picture of foreign investments it is important to note 
that the relatively large inﬂ ux of foreign capital primarily stems from EU countries. 
There are, however, differences based on historical and geographical contingencies. 
For instance, the two Baltic countries tend to orient themselves toward Scandinavia, 
whereas foreign investments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia mostly originate 
in Austria and Germany (UNCTAD, various countries, 2004). Corresponding to 
the pattern of FDI, trade relations are also oriented towards the EU with more than 
50 percent of all trade going to EU countries (EU Commission 2004). This pattern 
supports our initial argument that for the small new EU countries, response to globali-
zation pressures is to a large extent equal to Europeanization and EU membership.
Generally the four countries are examples of successful transitions to market 
economy, and based on indicators such as growth, foreign trade, and direct foreign 
investments, they handle global competition quite well. But there are major differ-
ences between the two groups of countries. First, if we look at trade deﬁ cits, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia manage to stay right below 3 percent of GDP, while 
the Estonian and Latvian deﬁ cits are about 20 percent of GDP (EU Commission 
2004). This difference may be related to each country’s level of integration into the 
Soviet planned economy, giving these countries a less fortunate point of departure. 
Second, unemployment is also relatively high. The Czech Republic did best with 
an unemployment rate of only 8.2 percent, followed by Estonia at 9.7, Latvia at 
10.3, and Slovakia with the highest rate at 16.5 percent (ibid.). The overall evalu-
ation, then, is that success can be differentiated between the Czech Republic and 
Estonia as the most successful, Slovakia as less so, and Latvia as the weakest. In 
relation to our 2+2 design this gives a variation in the dependent variable within 
each selected subset. 
Our point of departure was the expectation that swift implementation of a reform 
course and close adherence to it contribute to explaining the differences in success 
criteria, and that cleaving to the course depended on the will and ability to perse-
vere. Figure 3 provides an image of ability to stay the course of economic reform. 
The ﬁ gure shows a simple average of the reform process in eight essential areas 
as evaluated by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
The scale goes from 1 to 4+, 1 designating planned economy and 4+ a fully func-
tional market economy. Figure 3 shows that all four countries have applied the ‘Big 
Bang’ strategy, in that they all implemented massive reforms in the early 1990s. 
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However, the ﬁ gure also reveals the partitioning into two pairs. After the dissolu-
tion of Czechoslovakia the Slovakian tempo decreases, nearly grinding to a halt in 
the years 1994-1998. Already in 1997 Estonia, which implemented reforms over 
the shortest period of time, thus overtook Slovakia. Like the other countries where 
reforms were begun with the ‘easiest’ ones ﬁ rst, Latvia shows a leap in the develop-
ment in reform processes and a hiatus between 1996 and 1998.
Figure 3: Economic reform course. Average of EBRD indicators. 1989-2005
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Source: Own calculations based on EBRD (http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm). The ﬁ gure 
shows an unweighted average of the score for 1) large scale privatization, 2) small scale privatization, 
3) enterprise restructuring, 4) price liberalization, 5) trade and foreign exchange system, 6) competi-
tion policy, 7) banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and 8) securities markets & non-bank 
ﬁ nancial institutions. The scale is 1.0 (planned economy) to 4+(fully functional market economy)
Similar studies of the development of economic freedom (for instance from the 
Fraser Institute. See Gwartney - Lawson 2005) show the same picture. Estonia and 
the Czech Republic have consistently maintained a fast reform pace, while Latvia 
and Slovakia took a break in the mid-1990s, and then resumed reforms in the last 
years of the decade. Furthermore, Merlevede (2003) actually identiﬁ es reform re-
versals in Slovakia in 1997 and in Latvia in 1998. 
The capacity of the state to formulate and stick to political strategies and to 
implement reforms (‘governance’) shows a similar picture. State capacity can be 
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demonstrated by using the World Bank measure consisting of six different indica-
tors (Kaufmann – Kraay – Mastruzzi 2005). The six indicators include, among other 
items, assessment of the quality of the rules adopted (ability to regulate), constitu-
tional state (rule of law) and corruption control measures. The interactive module 
(World Bank 2006) shows that over the period from 1995-2004 the four countries 
have generally had better state capacity than the regional average. Whereas we 
expected the countries to have diverged because of the difﬁ culties encountered by 
the two former Soviet republics, it turned out that by 2004 Estonia scored the high-
est on all indicators. Latvia, despite remarkable results winds up at the bottom of 
the pile, barely surpassed by Slovakia and with the Czech Republic as the country 
that best measures up to Estonia over the period. An interesting difference shows 
up between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While the relative position of the 
Czech Republic has been consolidated, also under pressure from the progress in 
recent years in the other countries, Slovakian developments clearly demonstrate 
the problems encountered in the late 1990s, after which positions change, in fact so 
much that by 2004 Slovakia scores better than the Czech Republic on three of the 
indicators. 
On the face of it, resumption of reforms in Slovakia coincided with their being 
rejected in 1998 for negotiations over EU membership along with several other 
countries. The recommencement may be interpreted as a result of increased pres-
sure from the EU because it reinforced the impression that membership was pos-
sible only insofar as reforms were completed and the acquis fully implemented 
(Schimmelfennig - Sedelmaier 2005). Outside pressure may help explain why the 
pace was stepped up, but not why the reform process in some cases could be char-
acterized as ‘stop-go’, while in others it was continually ‘go-go’. Ability to institute 
reforms thus oscillates along with the success criteria, indicating that the pauses in 
the reform process are not due to economic conditions or general state capacity but 
most likely stem from internal political contexts. Something else must therefore 
contribute to the explanation. In the following we proceed with our thesis that na-
tion building choices have a causal effect on the ability and determination to stick 
to an Europeanization strategy.
Europeanization strategy and nation building
At the implosion of the Soviet system not much was known about how a transi-
tion could be made and the costs it would entail (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999:107). 
All countries went through a period of extraordinary politics (Balcerowicz 1994), 
in which the governments were free to implement almost any reform they wanted, 
as normal channels of political inﬂ uence – parties, organizations and parliament – 
were still not fully developed, and the governments had a mandate for change. As 
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shown in Figure 3 above, the pace of reforms was very high in all four counties for 
the ﬁ rst few years, but then they went their separate ways.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia
The Soviet military crackdown in Prague in the spring of 1968 gave rise to an 
orthodox communist regime in Czechoslovakia. In contrast to Hungary, where they 
in the 1980s had experimented with private ownership of smaller companies and 
businesses in the service sector, Czechoslovakia had made absolutely no attempts 
to liberalize the economic system. The system was ﬁ nally changed after the huge 
demonstrations in Prague and Bratislava in 1989 that paved the way to the presi-
dency for Vaclav Havel, co-founder of Charter 77, and the ﬁ rst free elections were 
held in the spring of 1990.
The general view expressed by the Czechoslovakian opposition was that incor-
poration into the East bloc in 1948 was based on an historical injustice that moved 
the boundary between Western and Byzantine culture several hundred kilometers 
west (Mason 1992: 39–40). Czechoslovakian Europeanization policy was therefore 
begun under the slogan ‘Return to Europe’, and it precipitated early contacts with 
international organizations, including membership of the OECD and application 
for membership of NATO and the EU. Neo-liberal economic reforms were soon set 
in motion by the Czech Prime Minister, economist Vaclav Klaus.
Although the Czech and Slovakian parts of Czechoslovakia followed the same 
path of reform, the negative consequences were far less severe in the Czech part 
(see ﬁ gure 1). Vladimir Meciar, leader of the Slovakian reform movement, therefore 
argued that a more gradual economic reform pace was needed. In consequence he 
proposed a looser federal arrangement with the Czech part. Prime Minister Vaclav 
Klaus ﬁ ercely rejected the proposal, arguing that Slovakia in case of different paces 
of economic reform would harvest the gains of sheltering behind a thriving Czech 
economy without sharing the burdens. The consequence was the ‘Velvet Divorce’ 
and a split in economic reform policy as well as in Europeanization strategy in 
which the Czech Republic adhered to a neo-liberal economic reform and Europe-
anization strategy under the heading ‘EU is the only option’ (Mudde 2004), while 
Slovakia changed towards a gradual economic reform and adopted a zigzag course 
towards the EU (Pridham 2002b: 209).
The dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation meant that in addition to politi-
cal and economic reform they each had to confront a nation building process. The 
Czechs soon agreed to base their statehood on citizenship. This implies that all 
inhabitants of the Czech Republic were automatically accorded citizens’ rights, 
symbolizing the polity. The Slovaks, on the other hand, chose to deﬁ ne their project 
in terms of nationality, that is, the Slovakian state was to belong to the Slovakian 
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people, thus emphasizing an ethno-cultural divide. This difference in the principles 
of state building is rooted in the fact that there was a large Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia. In addition, the Czechs were loath to revive Czech-Bohemian rivalry, 
strengthening their resolve to design a citizenship policy that removed the issue of 
nationality from the debate (Tesser 2003). 
The Europeanization strategy in the two new countries also diverged. Even though 
Klaus found that the Czech Republic was a natural part of the EU, he claimed that 
the EU is founded on the sovereignty of the members, and that Brussels might learn 
a great deal from the Czech Republic. Minister of foreign affairs, Jan Zieleniec, 
clariﬁ ed the issue by warning the EU against developing a non-transparent bu-
reaucracy along Soviet-communist lines (Fawn 2004: 31–32), and also Klaus has 
criticized the EU monetary union and its approach to social policy (Pridham 2001: 
63). However, that has not changed the consensus over EU membership as the only 
and necessary foreign policy strategy.
In contrast to the Czech Republic ‘Europe as an idea’ was less prevalent in Slo-
vakia and the nationality issue became a crucial factor. The ﬁ rst Slovak election in 
1992 thus brought Vladimir Meciar to power on a heavily populist and nationalist 
rhetoric, which was reinforced when the Hungarian elite toyed with irredentism as 
part of the political agenda (Tesser 2003: 509, 512). In addition, the coalition agree-
ment with a nationalist party meant that the domestic political costs of complying 
with international standards for minority rights, agreed to when Slovakia was part 
of Czechoslovakia, were much too high for Meciar’s government (Sadurski 2004: 
379). Under Meciar, the rights of the Hungarian minority were thus of a formal 
nature, while the actual conditions for Hungarians deteriorated, in part because 
of language laws that circumscribed the right of the Hungarian minority to use 
their own language (Tesser 2003: 513). Meciar’s policies came under severe criti-
cism from the international community, including the EU, which in its ﬁ rst report 
on Slovakia found that the country did not comply with the political criteria of 
the Copenhagen agreement. In addition, Meciar’s political overtures to Russia did 
anything but mollify the EU and estranged the governing Slovakian elite from their 
European colleagues (Pridham 2002b). 
Structural explanations like growing economic interdependence between EU and 
Slovakia, criticism by EU and reluctance to grant Slovakia negotiation status were 
utilized by Mikulas Dzurinda and were probably at least indirect reasons for the elec-
tion result and change of government in 1998 (Vachudova 2005: 140). The change 
of government, moreover, also – at least temporarily – closed the nationality because 
the Hungarian minority party was invited to participate in the governing coalition. 
Strong political disagreements between the Hungarian minority party and the rest of 
the governing coalition indicate that the inclusion was a strategic and tactical step by 
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Dzuinda, and he most likely went to such lengths to convince the EU Commission 
about the earnestness of Slovakian minority policy (Pridham 2002a: 964).
A comparison of the two countries indicates that a coherent Europeanization 
strategy and the nationality question go hand in hand with reform process and state 
capacity. In the Czech Republic the political determination to join EU and a dis-
closure on the question of minority rights point to the overall determinant ‘go-go’ 
policy in the economic area, in contrast to Slovakian indicators.
Estonia and Latvia
Estonia and Latvia were fully integrated in the Soviet economy when they 
achieved independence in August 1991. They had to set up new institutions and 
stabilize their economies. The problems seemed insurmountable as illustrated by 
the fact that money was still printed in Moscow and inﬂ ation running rampant.
But both countries had strong resources at hand. There was consensus that a mar-
ket economy was the solution: market economy not only as a negation of the Soviet 
system, but also as means to prosperity, developments that had had been halted 
by the Soviet occupation (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 107). Both countries thus 
implicitly draw on their historical experience of the ‘golden era’, that is, indepen-
dence in the interwar years, when their economic wealth corresponded to that of 
Finland (Hiden – Salmon 1991). On a similar note, the desire for reuniﬁ cation with 
Europe was an important political and cultural driving force. In their struggle for 
independence the European values of the rights of the individual were in stark con-
trast to the Soviet collective with its Byzantine traditions of authoritarian solutions 
(Lauristin – Vihalemm 1997).
Here the paths diverged, however. Estonia kept up the pace of reforms, whereas 
Latvia after 1992 saw a slowdown (see ﬁ gure 3). Martin Paldam (2002: 170) tries to 
explain the Latvian stop-and-go policy with the frequent government reshufﬂ es and 
changes. But Estonia has had about the same number of changes as Latvia, but still 
managed to keep reforms on track.1 The explanation of the different reform policies 
and Latvia’s ‘stop-and-go’ policy was as being due to domestic policies, in that the 
nationality issue came to dominate far more in Latvia than in Estonia, leading to 
problems in the reform process.
Estonia and Latvia both experienced massive immigration of Russophones in 
the Soviet era, and by the census in 1989, Estonians and Latvians constituted 
1 Between about 1990 and 2002/2003 Latvia and Estonia have each had 10 different governments 
and 8 to 9 prime ministers respectfully (Johannsen – Stålfors 2005: 33-36). In fact it is only the 
Czech Republic where a stable government from 1992 to 1997 has carried out radical, neo-liberal 
reforms (Hellman 1998: 123). However needless to say that this stable government was forced to 
step back due to economic scandals.
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respectively 61.5 and 52.0 percent of the populations (Nørgaard et al. 1996: 172). 
In Estonia practically all non-Estonians were immigrants from this period, which 
made it politically feasible to label them ‘colonizers’ and deny them citizenship 
on that basis. Consequently, the Estonians were able to reconstruct the nation and 
gain legitimacy by ‘satisfaction in the titular population’ (see above) at a time 
when the bottom of the J-curve had not yet been reached. In contrast, Soviet 
era immigrants in Latvia amounted to just half of the non-Latvians. The rest of 
the Russian-speaking minority were descendants primarily of ethnic Russians 
and Byelorussians who had citizenship in the interwar republic. They and their 
descendants were therefore granted citizenship automatically. They used voting 
rights to form their ‘own’ parties, which made the citizenship question a potent 
fault line in the Latvian party system (Smith-Sivertsen 2004). The citizenship 
question meant that the nation building process continued to occupy the political 
agenda, and as late as October 1998, the nationalist parties tried in a referendum 
to repeal a law that, on the behest of the EU, was to simplify the process of grant-
ing citizenship (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 84-85).
The Latvian process of deﬁ ning and building the nation also impacted the unof-
ﬁ cial economy and led to the formation of a left wing alternative to the neo-liberal 
approach to the reform process. Minorities were over-represented among industrial 
workers and they were hit hard by the economic reforms. But unlike those in Es-
tonia, the Latvian minorities had political clout, and although the reform course 
could not be veered from, their inﬂ uence sufﬁ ced to delay the process, leading to 
a legal vacuum for spontaneous privatizations, and a thriving unofﬁ cial economy 
(Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 150).2 
While the ethnic cleavage nurtured (or arose concurrently with) the development 
of a left-right dimension in Latvia, the Estonian parties sought consensus on the 
major objectives of economic reform, EU and NATO membership. The national 
movement in Estonia was based on a network that originated among students at the 
University of Tartu (Bennich-Björkman 2006). Under Mart Laar’s leadership, the 
young and inexperienced activists of the movement in the guise of the Pro Patria 
party (Rahvuslik Koonderakond Isamaa) won the ﬁ rst free election in 1992. They 
were inspired by neoliberalism and reforms were initiated and maintained despite 
changing governments. This consensus over reform strategy developed to the point 
where the concept ‘left wing’ became a derogatory term used against the Estonian 
2 In Latvia the unofﬁ cial economy is estimated to comprise 35.3 percent of GDP in 1995, whereas 
the corresponding ﬁ gure for Estonia was a modest 11.8 percent (Åslund – Boone – Johnson 2001). 
This points to yet another layer of explanation such as the one provided by Havrylyshyn - Odling-
Smee (2000), who argue that the actors in the informal economy might have an interest in seeing 
to it that economic reforms are stuck midstream until their proﬁ ts become large enough that they 
may be presumed to become more interested in legal protection of their holdings.
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Center Party (Bennich–Björkman 2005). A liberal market economy had gained 
status as a fundamental idea in Estonian society to such an extent that a few lib-
eral members of parliament questioned Estonian membership of the EU because it 
meant that Estonia, as part of the customs union, was to implement barriers against 
third countries.
The elites, nation building and the European project
The underlying reason for the reform breaks in Latvia and Slovakia is that the 
political project and the political agenda came to reﬂ ect the problems of nation 
building, while the elites in Estonia and the Czech Republic managed to keep 
these issues off the agenda and upheld their consensus about the necessity of Eu-
ropeanization. The Czech Republic and Estonia thereby exemplify the criticism 
raised by Grabel (2000) about elite–driven reform projects. The implication is not 
that Latvia and Slovakia are more democratic. Rather, the speciﬁ c constellation 
between four simultaneous transitions spheres – economic and political reforms, 
state and nation building – politicized the question of minorities and set the stage 
for debates that has yet to be addressed in the Czech Republic and Estonia.
The Estonian debate has recently revolved around elite democracy and social 
exclusion in the wake of economic reforms. Estonian researchers from the social 
sciences have warned that power is now so far from the people that we may speak 
of two ‘Estonias’, one comprising a self-centered political elite that was never held 
accountable, and one consisting of a socio-economically marginalized population, 
warning that ‘the individualism of early capitalism now needs to be tempered by 
a principle of solidarity (Pettai 2005: 33), a criticism that Prime Minister Mart Laar 
refuses to accept.
In the Czech Republic the divide in policy on Europe turned out to run be-
tween Klaus’ party, which ﬁ nds the EU to be insufﬁ ciently liberal, and a left wing 
– including an unreformed communist party – who thinks the EU is not social 
enough. In addition, even though the question of nationality was eliminated very 
early from Czech politics, the Europeanization strategy has forced the Czechs to 
adopt all international demands for minority rights and to live up to EU standards 
in that area. The issue resurfaced, in part because the EU has recognized the 
Roma as a national minority and not an immigrant population, which is how the 
Czech government sees them (Tesser 2003). This distinction is essential for the 
status and rights of Romas in the Czech Republic and has recently resulted in 
Roma demonstrations in Prague. 
The accession process has provided a framework for the political debate in the 
nation building process. Now the fundamental asymmetry, the right of the EU to 
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refuse membership if a country fails to comply with the Copenhagen Agreement 
(Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig – Sedelmeier 2005) has disappeared, the pending 
question is how and if nation building will ﬁ nd its way back to the political arena 
and what the domestic political consequences may be. 
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